Friday, September 25, 2009

1942 I. M. Antyufeev, Soviet 327th Rifle Division

Combat Operations of the 327th Rifle Division between January – June, 1942.
I. M. Antyufeev
Major-General (ret.), former Commander of the 327th Rifle Division


On the evening of 31 December 1941, the commander of the 2nd Shock Army, Lieutenant-General G. G. Sokolov, ordered me to replace units of the 52nd Army on the eastern bank of the Volkhov on the Selishch barracks-Gorodok sector by January 3rd and to be ready to attack on January 6th. The division had been assigned the task of breaking through the enemy's defenses on the left bank of the Volkhov, bypass enemy strong points and capture the railway station of Lyuban' – eighty miles from the breakthrough zone.

My attempts to prove that the division was not prepared for an offensive by the designated date owing to a lack of sledges for transport, incomplete complement of ammunition and weapons, and a shortage of provisions and fodder fell on deaf ears. The general raised his finger upwards, leaving me to understand that this command came from “on high” and was not subject to discussion.

By dawn, 3 January 1942, the 1100th and 1098th Rifle Regiments had relieved the units of the 52nd Army and had taken over the defenses on the eastern bank of the Volkhov. The defensive positions were set out in a rather primitive fashion: intermittent knee-deep trenches for the firing line with shelters arranged here and there for the command personnel. There were no obstacles or entanglements set up. All that was known of the enemy was that he was defending the western bank.

At dawn, January 7th, the offensive began along the entire sector between the Selishch barracks and the village of Kolomno (a distance of 4 kilometers). To the right, the 59th Army began its attack.

The attack was a failure owing to the inability of the artillery to provide supporting fire for the infantry.

On the morning of January 13th, the division resumed the offensive following a 20 to 30 minute artillery barrage.

Before us lay the frozen expanse of the Volkhov river. From our positions to the foremost lines of the enemy's defenses was a distance of between 800 to 1000 meters. But between the meter-and-a-half deep snow, the -30 degree weather and the continuous enemy machine gun and mortar fire, it was not until 1400 hours that the attacking regiments managed to cover this distance.

As a result of the attack, the German defenses on the sector of Bor-Kostylevo, Arefino and Krasniy settlement were broken through and the enemy was thrown back to the line of the river Polist'. Units of the 54th Army, however, had failed to capture the village of Kolomno, and on January 14th we were ordered to seize it. On January 19th, following a bitter battle which involved the support of the 57th Independent Ski Battalion, the division occupied Kolomno.

Before the end of January, the division, pursuing orders, waged a fierce but unsuccessful fight for the town of Spasskaya Polist'. After suffering heavy losses during the fighting in January, the division was withdrawn to the front reserve for reinforcements.

On February 24th, the division was concentrated in a forested area near the small village of Ogorel'e, 40-45 kilometers north-west of Myasniy Bor. Ogorel'e was also the location of the headquarters of the 2nd Shock Army. The Front Commander, K. A. Meretskov, ordered the division to capture Lyuban', seizing the village of Krasnaya Gorka along the way. To carry out this order, the division had to accomplish a 25 kilometer march, including 10 kilometers through a trackless, snow-bound forest. The division moved at a pace of two kilometers an hour.

The 13th Cavalry Corps, under General Gusev, along with an under-equipped tank brigade, was situated in a forest, 5-6 kilometers form Krasnaya Gorka. Not awaiting the arrival of the division, Gusev decided capture Krasnaya Gorka and then Lyuban' with the lead forces of the 1100th Rifle Regiment and the 80th Cavalry Division of Colonel L. A. Slanov, along with a company of tanks. Overall command was to be given to the 80th Cavalry Division.

The forward detachment broke through the enemy's defenses and advanced upon Lyuban', but here the main forces of Gusev's operational group found themselves under heavy and continuous attack from the air. Many horses were killed in both the cavalry corps as well as our division and the guns and carts were unhitched. Anti-aircraft defense was woefully deficient. Enemy aircraft literally hung over our heads from dawn to dusk and continually bombed and strafed our positions, so that even the smallest group of men were incapable of moving. Our aircraft was nowhere to be seen. The main forces were unable to follow after the lead detachment until darkness fell. An enemy counter-attacked restored the German defenses at Krasnaya Gorka, sealing the breakthrough. Attempts on the part of the main forces to breakthrough the German defenses were repulsed.

The forward detachment, consisting of the 80th Cavalry Division and the 1100th Rifle Regiment, found itself surrounded, yet continued to advance upon Lyuban' – destroying small enemy units along the way. On the south-western outskirts of Lyuban', the enemy offered stiff resistance, launching a tank attack which threw our detachment back into the woods.

The forward detachment then switched over to the defensive and fought while encircled for a period of ten days. Stores of food and ammunition ran out and attempts to supply the forces from the air were unsuccessful. Communications were cut as the radio sets broke down. The detachment was forced to destroy all of its military vehicles and heavy weapons, right down to the machine guns. Armed with only personal weapons, the troops fought their way through to us during the night of March 8-9.

Shortly afterwards, the cavalry corps was withdrawn to the rear, while the 327th Rifle Division switched to the defensive. It was engaged in reconnaissance activities along a front stretching around eight kilometers, as well as local fighting focused upon capturing Krasnaya Gorka. The latter was finally accomplished only by the middle of March. During the second half of the same month, we received orders to put up a stubborn defense. For almost a month, the enemy displayed no activity, but from the second half of April onwards began pursuing operations along the entire defensive sector of our division, which was in dire need of ammunition and was unable to counter the enemy pressure. Meanwhile, interruptions with the delivery of provisions began. All the roads had become unusable. Supplies were brought in on pack horses or on the backs of men.

Finding ourselves encircled for almost three months, we ate everything that was possible to eat. First, we slaughtered those horses which had remained alive, then the corpses of those buried in the snow. Everything was used for food. The hunger even drove us to collect pine needles and birch sap...

In the middle of May, the 2nd Shock Army received the order to withdraw. The main forces of the army were to leave the encirclement over a period of 7 to 10 days. Our division, which was located at the far edge of the pocket, was given the task of covering the army's retreat. On May 25th, orders came down to begin pulling out, and on the evening of the same day our units abandoned their defense positions. The withdrawal from Krasnaya Gorka was undetected by the enemy, despite the onset of the bright summer nights.

Thus began the epic departure of our division from the pocket. Gradually withdrawing, we were forced to hold the enemy at bay not for the 7 to 10 days envisioned by the Army headquarters, but for more than 40 days.
The trackless forested and swampy terrain did not allow the enemy to organize a hasty pursuit. We took up the first switch line and having dug in, our division held off furious enemy attacks for four days.

After the enemy managed to turn our exposed flanks, we pulled back to the next defensive line at the village of Finev Lug. We held on to our defensive positions here until the middle of June, while Finev Lug itself switched hands several times. To our left, however, the enemy succeeded in smashing the positions held by a partisan detachment and began bypassing the left flank of our division. We were forced to abandon this line as well, having destroyed all of our heavy weapons and vehicular transport, as we had run out of fuel and there were no more horses. As we withdrew, we would resist wherever favourable – at every stream and every woodland and marshy clearing.

During the night of June 25th, the army's military council ordered our remaining forces to break through the enemy's defenses and escape from the encirclement. Towards us came enemy tanks, which we had to to hold back while withdrawing towards Myasniy Bor.

The remnants of the army, including the 327th Division, were compressed into a small scrap of land near Myasniy Bor and were subjected to destructive enemy fire from all sides and from all types of weapons.
At the last moment, the Military Council of the 2nd Shock Army issued orders to escape the encirclement in small groups, independently, regardless of whom, where and how it was accomplished.

The failed escape attempt and the subsequent order of the Military Council of the army had a depressing effect upon the remaining troops. Men began to disperse in all directions, both singly and in groups, in order to escape from the pocket. The majority of them quickly perished however. The only more or less weak spot in the enemy's defenses was his rear. It was in this direction that I decided to force my way through, while also determining where and how I would be able to cross the front to our forces “in the open”. Around me were assembled several dozen officers and men from various units and formations. We succeeded in breaking through the chain of German machine guns into the enemy's rear, but few managed to escape. The majority of the men perished, while some were taken prisoner. This latter fate was one I also failed to avoid – on 5 July 1942.

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